



ASPIDES MARITIME SECURITY IN INDIAN OCEAN (EXCEPT PIRACY) THREAT UPDATE 19 0700 NOV - 19 0700 UTC DEC 2024

The ASPIDES Threat Update is issued to keep the maritime industry informed about recent events in the South Red Sea (SRS) and West Gulf of Aden (GOA). It includes updates on the situation, assessments and recommendations. For reporting mistakes or updates, please contact MSCHoA at **postmaster@mschoa.org** or call Tel: **+33 298220220** or **+33 298220170**.

1/ In Details.

• NTSR.

2/ AIS Statistics for missiles attacks (since 19th Feb)

- From the total missile attacks on MV with AIS OFF only 13% were successful.
- From the total missile attacks on MV with AIS ON 75% were successful.



3/ Abbreviations

EL EU OHQ EUNAVFOR « ASPIDES »




ABBREVIATIONS ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile AST Armed Security Team FV Fishing Vessel Merchant Vessel ΜV OWA One Way Attack PoC Port of Call RTB **Return To Base** SV Sailing Vessel UAS **Uncrewed Aerial System Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle** UAV USCENTCOM United States Central Command USV **Uncrewed Surface Vehicle** UTC Coordinated Universal Time






4/ Incident maps involving MV













5/Assessment

Most probable scenario - updated on Jul 03, 2024

Initially, the threat of targeting was against "Israeli-linked" ships, however it has been extended to U.S. and UK-affiliated vessels too.

Nevertheless, the number of ships being targeted, with no evidence of a link with any of these countries, underscores the notion that any ship is susceptible to targeting in the area. Additionally, there are indications that outdated information might be used regarding ship ownership in certain instances.

The attacks are expected to predominantly involve missiles and UAVs, with USVs becoming an emerging threat. The attack sequence may commence with a VHF communication, instructing the vessel to alter its course towards a harbor. Failure to comply could result in a kinetic assault. The direct boarding attempts, observed in previous instances, have not been observed recently given the robust presence of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and other like-minded Operations. Nevertheless, the presence of skiffs harassing merchant navy ships in the vicinity of Red Sea (RS), Bab el Mandeb (BAM) and Gulf of Aden (GoA), indicates a potential resurgence of the boarding approach.

UAV, USV and missile attacks occur along the primary navigation route off the coast of Yemen, with the highest risk area spanning approximately 200 nm northbound and eastbound of BaM, towards the South Red Sea and GoA accordingly, as shown on the maps.

The occasional increase of confirmed attacks in the RS, BAM and GoA proves the fact that Houthis still hold the capacity to launch such attacks.

Looking at the wide Indian ocean, the capture of a merchant vessel in the international waters near Hormuz, the fourth of its kind being currently hold hostage, shows that the threat of hijacking is still present in this part of the ocean. Masters and shipping companies are therefore advised to adhere to the recommendations laid out in Best Management Practices (BMP).





6/Recommendations

For recommendations to seafarers, please follow the link: <u>https://on-shore.mschoa.org/eu-navfor-aspides/</u>